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Respondents’ challenge to the Guidance does not 
present an Article III case or controversy.  The al-
leged injuries on which respondents base their claim 
of standing all involve indirect and incidental effects 
of a kind that this Court has never found sufficient to 
justify an exercise of the judicial power.  Accepting 
any of respondents’ proffered bases for standing 
would fatally compromise “the constitutional limita-
tion of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases 
or controversies,” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 
547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006), and do violence to the  
“separation-of-powers principles” that serve “to pre-
vent the judicial process from being used to usurp the 
powers of the political branches,” Clapper v. Amnesty 
Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013). 
If the Court reaches the merits, it should uphold 
the Guidance because it is a substantively and proce-
durally sound exercise of the Secretary’s broad statu-
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tory authority under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.  Respondents have 
emphasized the Guidance’s scope—but now concede 
(Br. 39) that the Secretary has unreviewable discre-
tion to accord each alien it covers a non-binding, tem-
porary reprieve from removal.  That perfectly de-
scribes deferred action.  The crux of respondents’ 
challenge to this exercise of discretion—the claim that 
it confers on aliens whose presence Congress has 
deemed unlawful the right to remain lawfully in the 
United States—is simply wrong.  Aliens afforded 
deferred action remain in violation of the immigration 
laws, are subject to removal proceedings at any time, 
and gain no defense to removal.  See pp. 16-18, infra.  
And respondents are wrong to insist that, even though 
Congress has authorized the Secretary to tolerate the 
ongoing presence of the parents and children at issue 
here, the Secretary is forbidden to authorize them to 
work to provide for their families while they remain 
here.  The INA contains no such senseless restriction 
on the Secretary’s authority.   
 RESPONDENTS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING I.
A. None Of Respondents’ Theories Satisfies Article III 
Respondents lack Article III standing because they 
have not alleged a concrete, particularized injury to a 
legally protected interest that is fairly traceable to the 
Guidance.  
1. Self-generated costs 
Respondents cannot establish Article III standing 
on the basis of the incidental effect of the Guidance on 
which the court of appeals relied:  Texas’s claim that 
the Guidance will lead it to incur increased expenses 
in subsidizing the issuance of driver’s licenses. 
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a. Any increased subsidy costs Texas may incur 
provide no basis for standing because they are not 
fairly traceable to the Guidance.  Texas has chosen to 
subsidize driver’s licenses for all aliens within various 
federal immigration categories.  If that choice no 
longer suits Texas’s interests, it can make a different 
choice.  What it cannot do is maintain the voluntary 
link between its fisc and federal law, and then demand 
that federal policy not change in a way that would 
indirectly increase its costs. 
This is not an argument (Resps. Br. 22) that a liti-
gant lacks standing whenever it can change its own 
behavior to avoid injury that a defendant’s actions 
would otherwise inflict.  The point is far narrower, but 
nonetheless fundamental under our system of sepa-
rate sovereigns:  When a State makes a voluntary 
choice to tie a state-law subsidy to another sovereign’s 
actions, the State does not thereby obtain standing to 
sue the other sovereign whenever the latter’s actions 
incidentally increase the cost of that subsidy.   
That is the holding of Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 
426 U.S. 660 (1976), and respondents cannot distin-
guish it.  There, as here, the State’s injury was “in-
flicted by its own hand,” and “nothing prevent[ed]” 
the State from changing its law to eliminate the harm.  
Id. at 664.  It is irrelevant that Pennsylvania was an 
original-jurisdiction case.  Article III’s original juris-
diction extends only to “cases” or “controversies,” and 
Pennsylvania involved neither because the alleged 
harm was self-generated.  Ibid.  This Court according-
ly has applied Pennsylvania outside the original-
jurisdiction context.  E.g., Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.  
And like Texas, Pennsylvania adopted its subsidy 
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before the change that prompted its suit.  See Penn-
sylvania, 426 U.S. at 662-663. 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), is not 
to the contrary.  Respondents suggest (Br. 25) that 
Wyoming overruled Pennsylvania, but it does not 
even mention Pennsylvania—doubtless because Wy-
oming did not involve self-generated injury—and this 
Court’s reliance on Pennsylvania in Clapper demon-
strates it was not overruled.  In Wyoming, Oklahoma 
enacted a tax that discriminated “on its face and in 
practical effect” against Wyoming coal, in violation of 
the Commerce Clause.  502 U.S. at 441.  Oklahoma 
utilities purchased “virtually 100%” of their coal  
from Wyoming, and the law’s stated purpose was to 
reduce the use of “Wyoming coal.”  Id. at 443.  Wyo-
ming thus did not involve the situation—here and in 
Pennsylvania—where the plaintiff State voluntarily 
yoked its fisc to another sovereign’s policies, and then 
sued to challenge those policies on the basis of their 
incidental costs.  Like Pennsylvania, Texas lacks a 
legally protected, judicially cognizable interest in 
challenging the other sovereign’s actions on such a 
basis. 
b. To the extent that respondents assert injury to a 
quasi-sovereign interest in Texas not feeling “pres-
sure” to change its policies, that alleged injury is 
entirely speculative, and not concrete, particularized 
or certainly impending.  Texas’s current policy is 
embodied in its existing laws and Department of Pub-
lic Safety (DPS) policies.  Texas chose to subsidize 
licenses for all eligible individuals, including deferred-
action recipients and many others, because it believed 
the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.  Texas is 
free to alter those judgments in any number of ways.  
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See U.S. Br. 25-26.  But Texas has not changed its 
policies in response to the Guidance (or in response to 
the 2012 DACA policy).  And it is impossible to know 
what change, if any, the Texas legislature or DPS 
might make in the future, what the basis for any such 
change might be, or whether federal law would 
preempt that choice.  See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (“Allegations of possible future 
injury” are insufficient.); Dellinger Amicus Br. 19-24.   
If Texas’s legislature or DPS were to act, a con-
crete case or controversy could be prompted.  A per-
son denied a subsidized license (or charged a higher 
price) could challenge that action, and Texas could 
defend on the ground that its new policy is not 
preempted.1  But it makes a mockery of this Court’s 
steadfast adherence to Article III’s limitations to 
argue that federal courts should adjudicate respond-
ents’ challenge to the Guidance in a suit against the 
United States in the absence of any change in Texas 
law or policy—based on speculation that Texas might 
someday make a change and that, if it did so, that 
change might be preempted. 
c. Finally, respondents lack standing to press the 
arguments in their brief—even if the “subsidy” theory 
were valid.  Respondents make clear (Br. 20-21) that 
                                                     
1  That is the posture of Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 
No. 15-15307, 2016 WL 1358378 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016).  The court 
there held that federal law preempts Arizona’s choice to issue 
driver’s licenses to aliens with employment authorization docu-
ments (EADs) issued because they applied for adjustment of 
status or for cancellation of removal, but not to aliens with EADs 
because of deferred action or deferred enforced departure, when 
“the federal government treats th[e] EADs the same in all relevant 
respects.”  Id. at *11.  Arizona did not invoke cost to justify its 
choice.  Ibid.  
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they do not object to deferred action (i.e., notifying 
the alien of a non-binding and temporary reprieve, as 
a matter of discretion), but instead challenge only “the 
Executive’s affirmative granting of lawful presence 
and work authorization.”  But Texas issues licenses to 
aliens on the basis of deferred action itself.  Tex. DPS, 
Verifying Lawful Presence 4 (July 2013).  Whether an 
alien is “lawfully present” for purposes of Social Secu-
rity or for the three- or ten-year admissibility bars 
under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B) is irrelevant to eligibility 
for a driver’s license.  And although Texas grants 
licenses to aliens with work authorization, id. at 3, 
aliens can obtain work authorization via the Guidance 
only if they already have deferred action, 8 C.F.R. 
274a.12(c)(14), and thus are eligible for a driver’s 
license under Texas law even without work authoriza-
tion.  Texas therefore cannot meet Article III’s re-
dressability requirement:  The same individuals would 
be eligible for the same license at the same price—
with or without Social Security, tolling of unlawful 
presence, or work authorization. 
2. Social services costs 
Respondents cannot establish a cognizable Article 
III injury based on their more generalized allegations 
that the Guidance will have the incidental effect of 
increasing Texas’s costs not only for driver’s licenses, 
but also for education, health care, and social services.   
This Court has never found such claims to be cog-
nizable under Article III, and doing so here would 
utterly transform the judicial power.  Federal courts 
would displace the political process as the preferred 
forum for policy disputes between individual States 
and the federal government because a potentially 
limitless class of federal actions could be said to  
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have incidental effects on a State’s fisc.  See U.S. Br. 
30-33; pp. 9-11, infra.  For example, the decision to 
regulate—or even not regulate—a particular drug or 
medical device might impose increased health care 
costs on a State.  Similarly, if “significant law en-
forcement costs” can generate standing, Resps. Br. 
27, then virtually any federal non-prosecution policy 
(such as for possessing small amounts of controlled 
substances) could arguably lead to increased state 
spending.  
Under our federal system of separate sovereigns, a 
State has no legally protected interest in avoiding 
such indirect and incidental consequences of actions 
taken by the United States in regulating individuals’ 
conduct pursuant to the powers vested in it by the 
Constitution.  U.S. Br. 22-23.  This Court has accord-
ingly never recognized such claims as “legally and 
judicially cognizable.”  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 
819 (1997).  And it would be especially inconsistent 
with the constitutional structure to allow such claims 
to proceed when they involve immigration.  A State 
lacks authority to interfere with federal immigration 
policies because, under the Constitution and the INA, 
formation of immigration policies is committed to the 
national government on the basis of the interests of 
the Nation as a whole, even though those policies may 
have significant indirect effects on the State.   
Furthermore, as the district court found, respond-
ents’ allegations of social-services costs are “too spec-
ulative to be relied upon by this or any other court.”  
Pet. App. 313a.  Those asserted costs flow from aliens’ 
mere presence in the State.  Ibid.  To find that the 
Guidance will incidentally increase them, the Court 
would have to conclude that the parents and children 
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here would leave this country in sufficient numbers to 
materially reduce those costs, if the Guidance were 
invalidated.  But as respondents recognize (Br. 39), 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
separately (and validly) exercised its discretion to 
make these individuals non-priorities for removal.  
These individuals have lived in this country for years 
and are particularly unlikely to depart voluntarily, 
leaving their children behind.  And work authorization 
naturally ameliorates need for state services, and thus 
should reduce the pressure on the State’s fisc.  Re-
spondents’ alleged social-services costs thus are ex-
ceedingly unlikely, not “certainly impending.”  Clap-
per, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.  
3. Parens patriae 
Respondents’ parens patriae argument (Br. 30-31) 
is meritless:  “A State does not have standing as 
parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal 
Government.”  Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982). 
4. “Special solicitude” 
Respondents cannot overcome these obstacles to 
standing by invoking the “special solicitude” for 
States referred to in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497, 520 (2007).  Respondents have not asserted a 
judicially cognizable “quasi-sovereign interest” pro-
tected by a specific “procedural right”—the two con-
siderations Massachusetts identified as necessary for 
its ruling.  Ibid.  The sovereign interest in protecting 
sovereign territory is well-settled.  Id. at 519.  But 
third parties generally lack a legally protected inter-
est in enforcement of the immigration laws against 
others, or the provision of benefits to others.  And 
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although Congress can provide States protection 
against certain indirect costs of immigration policies, 
e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1231(i), Congress has not created protec-
tion for States against the incidental impacts asserted 
here.  
The generic cause of action under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., is also 
no substitute for the necessary conditions for standing 
in Massachusetts.  It would have made little sense for 
this Court to attach “critical importance” to Con-
gress’s creation of a particular procedural right, Mas-
sachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516, if the APA already made 
that right available generally.  And respondents’ ap-
proach would allow States to bring claims to “vindi-
cate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper 
administration of the laws,” notwithstanding this 
Court’s assurance that such suits would not be “enter-
tain[ed].”  Id. at 516-517. 
B. Respondents’ Theories Would Fundamentally Trans-
form Article III 
The limitation of the judicial power to cases and 
controversies “is crucial in maintaining the tripartite 
allocation of power set forth in the Constitution.”  
DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341.  But respondents’ 
theories would expand the judicial power far beyond 
its circumscribed boundaries, and create precisely the 
risk of usurpation of the power of the political 
Branches that Article III forbids.  See Clapper, 133 
S. Ct. at 1146. 
In response, the most respondents can say (Br. 34) 
is that Article III’s injury-in-fact and causation re-
quirements would make it “much more difficult” to 
challenge grants of immigration relief in individual 
cases.  But respondents do not deny that their theory 
10 
 
would give a State standing to challenge any policy 
affecting any significant group of aliens—challenges 
that are the most likely to interfere with sensitive 
foreign policy imperatives and pressing humanitarian 
concerns. 
In respondents’ view, individual States could have 
challenged the federal government’s decision to admit 
or parole thousands of Cubans fleeing the Castro 
regime in the 1960s or thousands of Vietnamese flee-
ing a Communist takeover in the 1970s, to provide 
safe harbor to thousands of Chinese who feared re-
turning to their country after Tiananmen Square in 
the 1990s, or to issue any other consequential immi-
gration policy.  See U.S. Br. 31.  This risk is not hypo-
thetical, as Texas has sued the United States to block 
the settlement of Syrian refugees in the State.  See 
Texas Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. United 
States, No. 15-cv-3851, 2016 WL 1355596 (N.D. Tex. 
Feb. 8, 2016). 
Respondents’ theory of standing would also permit 
States to challenge changes to the federal definition of 
“disabled veteran,” “adjusted gross income,” or “pov-
erty,” or any other federal standard—so long as the 
State has linked its fisc to that standard.  U.S. Br. 32.  
Indeed, if the Court were to find standing based on 
incidental impacts on the state treasury even without 
such a link, virtually any change in federal policy 
could prompt an Article III dispute.  The judicial 
power would then extend to “almost every subject on 
which the executive could act,” “[t]he division of power 
[among the branches of government] could exist no 
longer, and the other departments would be swal-
lowed up by the judiciary.”  DaimlerChrysler, 547 
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U.S. at 341 (quoting 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 
(Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984)). 
Respondents suggest (Br. 34-35) that there is no 
need to worry because a plaintiff also must be within 
the zone of interests to sue, and suits must ultimately 
have merit.  That is cold comfort, given that respond-
ents also argue (Br. 37-38) that States are always 
within the INA’s zone of interests and that anyone 
who wants to comment in an administrative proceed-
ing can assert a cognizable notice-and-comment claim.  
The merits of a case are also no answer to an over-
reach of jurisdiction, as Article III’s limitations “are 
an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration 
of powers.”  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).   
Rather than deal seriously with the Judiciary’s 
properly limited role in our system of government, 
respondents seek to stoke “the natural urge to pro-
ceed directly to the merits of this important dispute 
and to ‘settle it’ for the sake of convenience and effi-
ciency.”  Raines, 521 U.S. at 820.  That is precisely 
what this Court’s precedents caution against, and 
respondents’ claims should be dismissed. 
 RESPONDENTS LACK A CAUSE OF ACTION II.
A. Respondents’ alleged injuries are far outside the 
“zone of interests” of any relevant statute.  Respond-
ents acknowledge that they “lack[] a judicially cog-
nizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution 
of another.”  Br. 20 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)).  They are therefore outside 
the zone of interests of decisions regarding deferred 
action itself, i.e., notifying an alien of a non-binding, 
temporary decision to forbear.  And respondents’ 
claims about deferred action’s consequences are even 
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further afield:  Title II Social Security is a federal 
benefit paid from federal taxes on the alien’s earnings, 
8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(2); tolling of “unlawful presence” is 
solely relevant to determining whether an alien is 
admissible under federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)(9)(B); and authorization for an alien to be 
lawfully employed, 8 U.S.C 1103(a), 1324a(h)(3), is 
unrelated to state-law expenses for driver’s licenses 
and social services.  Indeed, respondents do not seri-
ously contend that they have a stake in whether the 
federal government accords others such treatment. 
Respondents instead contend that different injuries 
are within the “zone of interests.”  But they do not 
dispute that “the same interest must satisfy both” 
Article III and the zone-of-interests test.  13A Charles 
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3531.7, at 513 (3d ed. 2008).  “[T]he plaintiff must 
establish that the injury he complains of (his ag-
grievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls 
within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by 
the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal 
basis for his complaint.”  Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990). 
B. Respondents’ assertion of these additional inju-
ries also fails on its own terms  Respondents contend 
(Br. 37) that they fall within the zone of interests of 
the INA as a whole because States bear indirect costs 
associated with immigration.  But this Court has re-
fused “to accept th[at] level of generality in defining 
the ‘relevant statute.’  ”  Air Courier Conference of 
Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 
498 U.S. 517, 529-530 (1991).  And respondents fail to 
identify a particular statutory provision under which 
they are “aggrieved.”  They have never asserted a 
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claim under the few INA provisions that take account 
of incidental financial impacts and allow States to seek 
reimbursement.  E.g., 8 U.S.C. 1231(i).  Otherwise, the 
INA does not “even hint[] at a concern about [the] 
regional impact” of federal immigration policy.  Fed-
eration for Am. Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 93 
F.3d 897, 899, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 
U.S. 1119 (1997) (prospect that aliens may “diminish[] 
employment opportunities” or “crowd[] public schools 
and other government facilities and services” does not 
fall within the INA’s zone of interests).   
Nor does Section 1324a encompass a State interest 
in guarding citizens against “labor-market distortion.”  
Resps. Br. 37.  That provision does not depart from 
the background rule that States cannot sue the federal 
government as parens patriae.  See p. 8, supra. 
Similarly, litigants do not gain an APA cause of ac-
tion simply because they wish to comment on agency 
rulemaking.  That approach would deprive the zone-
of-interests test “of virtually all meaning.”  Air Couri-
er Conference, 498 U.S. at 529-530.  See U.S. Br. 35. 
 THE GUIDANCE INVOLVES MATTERS THAT ARE III.
COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION BY LAW 
Respondents agree (Br. 38-39) that, under Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), they cannot impair 
“the Executive’s enforcement discretion,” and that the 
Executive remains free “to issue ‘low-priority’ identi-
fication cards to aliens.”  That perfectly describes 
deferred action itself, and effectively abandons any 
challenge to the Guidance to that extent. 
Heckler does not address the consequences that 
flow from non-enforcement discretion, such as the 
possible receipt of Social Security benefits.  But the 
government is not relying (Br. 39-41) on Heckler to 
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bar review of the Guidance on account of its conse-
quences.  The government is arguing that the conse-
quences do not make the Guidance reviewable because 
the Guidance does not change them—they flow from 
preexisting statutes, regulations, and policies.  Fur-
thermore, the government’s preexisting policies re-
garding those consequences are themselves commit-
ted to agency discretion, not because of Heckler but 
because the relevant “provisions furnish ‘no meaning-
ful standard against which to judge the [Secretary’s] 
exercise of discretion.’  ”  U.S. Br. 36 (quoting Lincoln 
v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993)). 
 THE GUIDANCE IS LAWFUL IV.
The Guidance is a lawful exercise of the Secretary’s 
broad authority to “[e]stablish[] national immigration 
enforcement policies and priorities,” 6 U.S.C. 202(5), 
and perform such acts as “he deems necessary for 
carrying out his authority” to “administ[er]” the INA, 
8 U.S.C. 1103(a).  These capacious grants of authority 
reflect Congress’s judgment that the Executive has a 
particular need for flexibility to balance pressing, 
often conflicting, and rapidly evolving resource, for-
eign-relations, national-security, and humanitarian 
imperatives in the immigration context.  See Arizona 
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“A prin-
cipal feature of the removal system is the broad dis-
cretion exercised by immigration officials”). 
Respondents fail to come to terms with the nature 
of the Secretary’s statutory authority or the history of 
its exercise.  Respondents acknowledge (Br. 38-39) 
that the Secretary has unreviewable authority to noti-
fy each person covered by the Guidance that he or she 
will receive a non-binding, temporary reprieve.  But 
respondents nonetheless assert that Congress has 
15 
 
drawn the line at non-enforcement of removal, and has 
denied the Secretary the authority to deal with the 
real-world consequences of his choices.  But since 
1960, the Executive has established more than 20 
policies for according deferred action (or similar 
forms of discretion) to large groups of aliens living in 
the United States, including the Family Fairness 
policy that covered as many as 1.5 million people—and 
all of those policies enabled aliens to work lawfully.  
See U.S. Br. 48-57.  Indeed, since 1981, regulations 
have reflected the commonsense proposition that 
aliens who may remain in this country, as a matter of 
the Executive’s discretion, also should be able to law-
fully make ends meet for themselves and their fami-
lies.  8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).  And Congress has re-
peatedly ratified the government’s position that de-
ferral of enforcement and work authorization go hand 
in hand.  See U.S. Br. 50-57. 
Respondents are fundamentally wrong to claim 
that the Guidance confers on aliens whose presence 
Congress has deemed unlawful the right to remain 
lawfully in the United States.  Aliens covered by the 
Guidance, like all aliens afforded deferred action, are 
violating the law by remaining in the United States, 
are subject to removal proceedings at the govern-
ment’s discretion, and gain no defense to removal.  
See pp. 16-18, infra.  Deferred action itself reflects 
nothing more than a judgment that the aliens’ ongoing 
presence will be tolerated for a period of time, based 
on enforcement priorities and humanitarian concerns, 
and work authorization enables them to support them-
selves while they remain.  If Congress believes that 
the Secretary’s authority should not be exercised in 
this manner, Congress is free to enact legislation to 
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channel or constrain that authority—as Congress has 
occasionally done in the past with respect to some 
other exercises of immigration discretion by the Ex-
ecutive.  But Congress has not done so in any way that 
is relevant here, and there is no basis in existing law 
to deny the Secretary the authority to implement the 
Guidance. 
A. “Lawful Presence” 
1. Respondents’ principal challenge to the Guid-
ance proceeds from a mistaken premise.  Respondents 
insist (e.g., Br. 17) that the Guidance “declares” un-
lawful conduct to be lawful.  But the Guidance does no 
such thing.  Respondents primarily rely on a single 
sentence in the Guidance, which states that “[d]e-
ferred action does not confer any form of legal status 
in this country, much less citizenship; it simply means 
that, for a specified period of time, an individual is 
permitted to be lawfully present in the United States.”  
Pet. App. 413a.  That sentence is purely descriptive 
and has no operative, legal effect.  Ibid.  Deleting it 
would not change the Guidance at all. 
2. “Lawful presence” in immigration law is funda-
mentally different from lawful status under the INA.  
See U.S. Br. 38-39; Memorandum from Donald 
Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir, Consolidation of Guid-
ance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of 
Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the 
Act 9-11 (May 6, 2009) (Unlawful Presence Guidance).  
Aliens with lawful status under the INA are here 
lawfully; their presence therefore is not a basis for 
removal.  By contrast, mere “lawful presence” occurs 
when the Executive “openly tolerate[s] an undocu-
mented alien’s continued presence in the United 
States for a fixed period (subject to revocation at the 
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agency’s discretion),” notwithstanding that the alien 
lacks lawful status and is present in violation of law.  
J.A. 76; see U.S. Br. 38-39; Unlawful Presence Guid-
ance 9-11.  “Lawful presence” thus might be better 
called “tolerated presence.”  Even with deferred ac-
tion and “lawful presence,” aliens lack lawful status, 
are actually present in violation of law, are subject to 
enforcement at the government’s discretion, and gain 
no defense to removal.  8 U.S.C. 1229a; see 8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1)(B); see also Pet. App. 413a, 
416a-417a; Unlawful Presence Guidance 42 (“does not 
make the alien’s status lawful”).  The Guidance chang-
es none of that. 
Moreover, there is no overarching and unified con-
cept of “lawful presence” that triggers a “coherent, 
aggregated package of ancillary ‘benefits.’  ” Anil 
Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement 
Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive 
Action on Immigration, 63 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. Dis-
course 58, 66 (2015).  Congress instead has used “law-
ful presence” in a technical sense in specific provisions 
to allow the Secretary to decide which categories of 
aliens should qualify for particular consequences.  
Aliens who the Secretary determines are “lawfully 
present” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(2) 
may receive Social Security benefits.  But the regula-
tory definition of that term is relevant “[f]or the pur-
poses of [those benefits] only,” 8 C.F.R. 1.3(a), and 
does not “confer any immigration status or benefit 
under the [INA],” 61 Fed. Reg. 47,040 (Sept. 6, 1996).  
Similarly, the separate definition of “unlawfully pre-
sent” for accruing time towards the inadmissibility 
bars applies only “[f]or purposes of th[at] paragraph.”  
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii).  Aliens thus can be “lawfully 
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present” for one purpose but not the other.  Aliens 
with pending applications for temporary protected 
status (TPS), for example, toll accrual of unlawful 
presence but cannot receive Social Security benefits.  
Unlawful Presence Guidance 7; see 8 C.F.R. 1.3(a).  
Notably, Texas itself uses “lawfully present” in just 
this way—to identify categories of aliens eligible for a 
benefit (i.e., a driver’s license), including many who 
lack lawful status.  Verifying Lawful Presence 1-5.2 
B. Social Security And Tolling 
1. The Guidance does not “flout[] Congress’s 1996 
decision to eliminate most federal benefits for unlaw-
fully present aliens.”  Resps. Br. 47.  DHS’s regula-
tions respect that decision.  Before 1996, aliens with 
deferred action could receive most federal benefits 
because they were “permanently residing in the  
United States under color of law” (PRUCOL).  E.g., 42 
U.S.C. 1382c(a) (1988); 20 C.F.R. 416.1618(a) and 
(b)(11) (1994).  But courts interpreted PRUCOL ex-
pansively also to include aliens without deferred ac-
tion, if the government merely did not contemplate 
removing them.  See Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 
1575-1578 (2d Cir. 1985).  In 1996, Congress prohibit-
ed aliens from receiving most federal benefits unless 
they are “qualified.”  8 U.S.C. 1611(a).  Aliens with 
                                                     
2  Respondents’ claim (Br. 11-12) that DAPA “triggers” access to 
advance parole is incorrect.  The Guidance does not establish any 
advance parole policy or grant advance parole to anybody.  The 
Secretary “may” grant parole (and advance parole) to immigrants 
without regard to deferred action or any “lawful presence.”  8 
U.S.C. 1182(d)(5); 8 C.F.R. 212.5(f ).  While DHS has been permis-
sive in authorizing travel by DACA recipients via advance parole, 




deferred action—including under the Guidance—are 
not “qualified,” see 8 U.S.C. 1641(b), and thus can no 
longer receive most federal benefits. 
At the same time, however, Congress created an 
express exception from that bar:  Non-“qualified” 
aliens may receive Title II Social Security benefits if 
they are “lawfully present in the United States as 
determined by the Attorney General.”  8 U.S.C. 
1611(b)(2).  The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) immediately promulgated regulations spe-
cifically providing that aliens with deferred action are 
“lawfully present” for this purpose—but that an alien 
“may not be deemed to be lawfully present solely on 
the basis of the [INS’s] decision not to, or failure to,” 
pursue removal.  61 Fed. Reg. at 47,041.  The INS 
thus included deferred action, but made fewer aliens 
eligible for Social Security and cut back on judicial 
interpretations of PRUCOL. 
The next year, Congress ratified the INS’s defini-
tion of “lawful presence” by amending Section 1611(b) 
also to allow non-“qualified” aliens to receive Medi-
care and Railroad Retirement benefits with the same 
proviso that they be “lawfully present in the United 
States as determined by the Attorney General.”  Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, Tit. V, 
§ 5561, 111 Stat. 638.  Congress thus added the same 
language to the same subsection of the same statute to 
“clarify that, despite general restrictions on Federal 
benefits for ‘non-qualified’ aliens, certain benefits  
* * *  are to remain available to those who earned 
them through work.”  H.R. Rep. No. 78, 105th Cong., 




2. Respondents similarly argue (Br. 49-50) that de-
ferred action cannot toll accrual of “unlawful pres-
ence” for purposes of the three- and ten-year bars in 8 
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B).  Section 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) pro-
vides that an alien is “deemed” to be “unlawfully pre-
sent” when he is present “after the expiration of the 
period of stay authorized by the [Secretary] or is 
present  * * *  without being admitted or paroled.”  8 
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii).  Respondents do not dispute 
that deferred action is an authorized “period of stay.”  
But noting that deferred action is not an “admi[ssion] 
or parole[],” they contend (Br. 50) that “[t]he disjunc-
tive second clause” forecloses DHS’s interpretation. 
Respondents are incorrect.  The first clause ad-
dresses how an alien’s presence should be “deemed” 
after expiration of a period of stay, not during such a 
period.  DHS sensibly construes Section 1182(a)(9)(B) 
as a whole not to deem an alien “unlawfully present” 
during an authorized stay, regardless of whether he 
was previously “admitted or paroled.”  See Unlawful 
Presence Guidance 22.  Otherwise, “unlawful pres-
ence” would accrue when an alien’s presence is actual-
ly lawful.  For example, asylum is a lawful status, but 
it does not constitute an “admission” (or parole).  In re 
V- X-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 147, 150-152 (B.I.A. 2013).  On 
respondents’ view, aliens who entered without inspec-
tion then received asylum would still accrue “unlawful 
presence”—notwithstanding that they actually have 
lawful status.  That would make little sense. 
3. Even if DHS impermissibly interpreted “lawful 
presence” in the Social Security or tolling provisions, 
that would provide no basis for enjoining the Guid-
ance.  The Guidance does not change those interpreta-
tions.  If respondents disagree with those determina-
21 
 
tions, they should petition for rulemaking—or at most 
a court, in a case properly before it, could declare that 
those interpretations are invalid.  Indeed, the accrual 
issue only matters for individuals who entered unlaw-
fully (i.e., without being “admitted or paroled”) and 
obtain deferred action before their 19th birthday—a 
sliver of the population covered by the Guidance.  And 
the inadmissibility bar is only triggered if a person 
“depart[s].”  8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B); Unlawful Pres-
ence Guidance 16-17. 
C. Work Authorization 
1. The Secretary has discretion to authorize aliens to 
work 
Since 1981, federal regulations—adopted pursuant 
to the Secretary’s broad authority under 8 U.S.C. 
1103(a)—have provided that any alien with deferred 
action may apply for work authorization based on 
economic need.  8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).  The Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 
U.S.C. 1324a, subsequently reinforced that regulation, 
providing that aliens may be authorized to work “by 
th[e] [INA] or by the [Secretary].”  8 U.S.C. 
1324a(h)(3) (emphasis added). 
Respondents nonetheless argue (Br. 56) that IRCA 
“repudiated” the Executive’s position that it may 
authorize aliens to be employed.  Specifically, they 
posit (Br. 52-53 n.42) that “by the [Secretary]” refers 
only to categories of aliens for whom the INA itself 
directs that “the Executive either must or may sepa-
rately grant work authorization.”  But Congress would 
not have attempted to repudiate the Attorney Gen-
eral’s settled position that he can authorize aliens to 
work by enacting a law expressly providing that he 
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can do just that.  The INS long ago rejected respond-
ents’ interpretation, concluding instead that IRCA 
ratified the INS’s prior view.  52 Fed. Reg. 46,093 
(Dec. 4, 1987).  That longstanding interpretation war-
rants deference.  U.S. Br. 54-55. 
Respondents are equally wrong to argue (Br. 51 
n.39) that DHS’s regulation specifically allowing al-
iens with deferred action to apply for work authoriza-
tion is valid only for “the four categories of deferred-
action recipients that Congress made eligible for work 
authorization,” and that this argument is timely be-
cause it did not accrue until now.  When that regula-
tion was promulgated in 1981 and repromulgated 
in 1987, deferred action was exclusively accorded  
“without express statutory authorization.”  Reno v. 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 
U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (AADC).  The statutes mentioning 
“deferred action” were enacted beginning in 2000.  
See U.S. Br. 58-59.  In respondents’ view, DHS’s regu-
lation thus applied to a null set for nearly 20 years.  
That cannot be correct.   
2. The Secretary has discretion to authorize the aliens 
covered by the Guidance to work 
a. Since 1960, the government has established 
more than 20 policies for exercising discretion via 
deferred action or similar practices, for aliens in de-
fined categories, and all of those policies enabled al-
iens to work lawfully.  See U.S. Br. 48-57.  Respond-
ents contend (Br. 54-55) that Congress has systemati-
cally curtailed DHS’s authority by amending the pa-
role and voluntary departure statutes and codifying 
TPS.  But none of those changes are relevant here. 
First, none of the government’s examples involved 
parole.  They involved deferred action, deferred en-
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forced departure (DED), and extended voluntary 
departure (EVD) for aliens who were already living 
here.  See U.S. Br. 48-50.  Second, Congress estab-
lished TPS to codify DHS’s discretionary practice of 
providing safe haven on a nationality basis, instituting 
a “more formal and orderly mechanism.”  H.R. Rep. 
No. 627, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988); see Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 (IMMACT), Pub. L. No. 101-649, Tit. 
III, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 5030 (8 U.S.C. 1254a).  In codi-
fying (not repudiating) that practice, Congress con-
firmed that the Secretary otherwise possessed the 
requisite authority.  And although Congress made 
TPS the exclusive basis for providing nationality-
based safe harbor, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(g), Congress did not 
restrict the Executive’s discretion to provide similar 
relief for different or additional reasons.  U.S. Br. 49 
n.9; see President George H.W. Bush, Statement on 
Signing the Immigration Act of 1990 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
Third, there would have been no reason for Con-
gress to amend the voluntary departure statute in 
1996 to stop the Executive from using EVD.  Resps. 
Br. 54.  By then, the Executive had already stopped.  
Id. at 55.  The Executive instead used DED and de-
ferred action, which Congress did not curtail.3 
                                                     
3  EVD is also different from “voluntary departure” under 
8 U.S.C. 1254(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).  That statute allowed 
aliens “under deportation proceedings” to “depart voluntarily” “in 
lieu of deportation.”  Ibid.  EVD was accorded without regard to 
whether deportation proceedings were underway and enabled 
aliens to remain without departing.  E.g., J.A. 213-215.  The INS’s 
EVD regulations accordingly identified Section 1103(a) as the 
authority.  See 43 Fed. Reg. 29,258 (July 10, 1978); accord Hotel & 
Rest. Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499, 1510 (D.C. 




b. Respondents contend (Br. 56-57) that IRCA’s 
“one-time legalization program” does not imply power 
“to create precisely the sort of magnet for unlawful 
immigration that Congress sought to avoid.”  But the 
Guidance is not a legalization program.  Unlike IRCA, 
it does not confer lawful status; it provides only a non-
binding, temporary reprieve as a matter of discretion.  
Nor is it a magnet:  It reaches only aliens who have 
already lived here since 2010, and frees up resources 
for increased border enforcement.  U.S. Br. 47.   
Legislation and experience after IRCA further con-
firm that the Guidance is lawful.  The INS established 
the Family Fairness policy in 1987, then expanded it 
in 1990 to target as many as 1.5 million people—
approximately 40% of the undocumented population—
for relief and work authorization.  U.S. Br. 64.  The 
policy here is strikingly similar.  Respondents note 
(Br. 54 n.43) that only 47,000 obtained relief under 
that policy—but Congress swiftly enacted a program 
that granted lawful status to the same aliens and ap-
proved the policy’s ongoing operation in the interim.  
IMMACT § 301(g), 104 Stat. 5030.  Respondents con-
tend (Br. 55) that Congress did not thereby “ratif[y] a 
claimed Executive authority to grant broader relief 
unilaterally.”  But the Guidance is materially identical.  
Under both policies, individuals are informed of a non-
binding and temporary reprieve, may apply for work 
authorization, and in turn may participate in Title II 
Social Security.  See J.A. 213-215 (forbearance and 
work authorization); see also 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(B) 
(1988); 20 C.F.R. 422.104(b) and (c) (1990) (Social 
Security). 
c. Respondents’ suggest (Br. 58) that the Secretary 
can grant work authorization only to “small” deferred-
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action categories, contending that the INS “justified 
its deferred-action regulation based on the miniscule 
number of work authorizations it would allow.”  That 
is misleading, as the INS was not referring specifical-
ly to deferred action.  When the INS recodified all of 
its work-authorization regulations in 1987, it men-
tioned that “the total number of aliens authorized to 
accept employment is quite small and the impact on 
the labor market is minimal” to rebut an argument 
that it was circumventing the INA’s labor-certification 
provisions by not “keep[ing] statistical records of the 
number of aliens permitted to work” under those 
regulations.  52 Fed. Reg. at 46,092. 
That statement should be read in context.  Even at 
the time, the INS clearly issued work authorization in 
significant numbers to categories not expressly identi-
fied by the INA as work-eligible.  In 1987, applicants 
for adjustment of status or asylum obtained work 
authorization solely by regulation.  8 C.F.R. 
274a.12(c)(8) and (9) (1988).  In 1986, 225,598 aliens 
adjusted status and 81,017 applied for asylum.  INS, 
1986 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Tbls. 6, 20, at 14, 41 (1987).  
In 1987, the INS announced a policy to accord EVD 
and work authorization to between 150,000 and 
200,000 Nicaraguans.  J.A. 210.  In 1990, the INS 
expanded the Family Fairness policy to target a group 
of as many as 1.5 million for EVD and work authoriza-
tion.  J.A. 65, 213-215.  Congress responded by ratify-
ing that policy—and amending Section 1324a without 
constraining the Secretary’s discretion to authorize 
work.  U.S. Br. 57. 
From 2008 through 2014, DHS issued or renewed 
3.4 million work authorizations (averaging 485,000 
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annually) to aliens who had filed applications for ad-
justment of status, without specific statutory authori-
zation for that category.  See USCIS, I-765 Approv-
als, Denials, Pending by Class Preference and Rea-
son for Filing (Feb. 6, 2015) (C9 category). 4   The 
Secretary’s discretion to authorize work by aliens thus 
is not limited to “small” absolute numbers. 
d. Respondents seek (Br. 59) to explain away this 
consistent historical practice on the theory that the 
INS was simply creating “bridges from one legal 
status to another.”  But they cite no statutory provi-
sion making that a prerequisite to the exercise of 
discretion or granting of work authorization.  Many 
uses of deferred action, EVD, and DED have been not 
as “bridges,” but “for humanitarian reasons.”  AADC, 
525 U.S. at 484; U.S. Br. 5-7; J.A. 209-212.  And all of 
those uses enabled aliens to work lawfully. 
In any event, DAPA itself is a “bridge” for parents 
who, with or without deferred action, already have an 
existing statutory path to lawful status through ob-
taining favored “immediate relative” visas.  See U.S. 
Br. 46.  At that point, parents who overstayed after a 
lawful entry may adjust to lawful permanent resident 
status, without more.  See 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) and (c)(2).  
Those who entered unlawfully may be admitted as 
lawful permanent residents after departing and re-
maining abroad (unless a waiver is available) ten 
years.  8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i), (ii), and (v).  Esti-
mates are that “[n]early half  ” of the unauthorized 
population overstayed.  Pew Hispanic Ctr., Modes of 
                                                     
4  Some Nicaraguan and Haitian applicants have specific statu-
tory authorization for work.  See Resps. Br. 8 & n.4.  In 2013, only 
200 people adjusted status under those provisions.  DHS, 2013 
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Tbl. 6, at 18 (Aug. 2014). 
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Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population 1 
(May 22, 2006).  These paths “take[] time,” and DAPA 
provides “a mechanism for families to remain togeth-
er, depending on their circumstances, for some or all 
of the intervening period.”  J.A. 93-94.   
In short, the Guidance oversteps no limit—
justiciable or otherwise—on the Secretary’s authority 
under the INA.  The choice of which lowest-priority 
aliens warrant deferred action is committed to his 
discretion by law, as respondents concede.  He simi-
larly has the authority under Sections 1103(a) and 
1324a(h)(3) to issue work authorization to every such 
alien with economic need.  8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14). 
 THE GUIDANCE IS EXEMPT FROM NOTICE-AND-V.
COMMENT REQUIREMENTS 
The Guidance is a general statement of agency pol-
icy exempt from notice-and-comment requirements 
because it “advise[s] the public prospectively of the 
manner in which [DHS] proposes to exercise a discre-
tionary power,” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281, 302 n.31 (1979) (quoting Dep’t of Justice, Attor-
ney General’s Manual on the Administrative Proce-
dure Act 30 n.3 (1947)), namely, to defer action.  See 
National Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 
252 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.).  Respondents do 
not dispute that the Guidance satisfies this Court’s 
straightforward test.  See U.S. Br. 65-68. 
A. Respondents instead propose different tests.  
They first argue (Br. 60-66) that the Guidance must go 
through notice and comment because it supposedly 
binds the discretion of individual DHS agents.  But 
that is backwards.  “Indeed, a central purpose of gen-
eral policy statements is to permit the agency head to 
direct the implementation of agency policy by lower-
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level officials,” as they help ensure that individual 
agents’ actions are not arbitrary or capricious.  Ad-
min. Law Scholars Amicus Br. 4; see id. at 8-17.  Re-
spondents’ test, by contrast, would “drive agency 
policy-making out of public view,” and lead to less 
oversight of agency action.  Id. at 16. 
In any event, DAPA does not “bind” DHS agents to 
accord deferred action to anyone.  DHS agents must 
deny a deferred-action request—even when every 
other criterion is satisfied—unless the alien “pre-
sent[s] no other factors that, in the exercise of discre-
tion, make[] the grant of deferred action inappropri-
ate.”  Pet. App. 417a; see id. at 419a (“[T]he ultimate 
judgment” is “determined on a case-by-case basis.”).  
Respondents view these express prerequisites to 
deferred action as pretextual.  But because DAPA can 
be validly applied even under respondents’ test, and in 
light of the strong presumption of official regularity, it 
is improper to enjoin DAPA where it “has yet to be 
implemented.”  Id. at 131a (King, J., dissenting); see 
id. at 234a-241a (Higginson, J., dissenting). 
B. Respondents also argue (Br. 66-67) that notice 
and comment is required because the Guidance has 
consequences “affect[ing] individual rights.”  Most 
exercises of discretion not to enforce a law against 
someone affect that person’s rights in some sense.  
But that does not give a rule “the force and effect of 
law”—i.e., create rights and obligations—which is 
what characterizes a substantive rule requiring notice 
and comment.  Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302 n.31; 
see Admin. Law Scholars Amicus Br. 17-19.  Indeed, 
the APA expressly provides that a “statement of poli-
cy” may “affect[] a member of the public” and be “re-
lied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency 
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against a party,” so long as it was made publicly avail-
able or there was actual notice, as occurred here.  
5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2).  Myriad policies similar to the 
Guidance have been established without notice-and-
comment procedures.  See U.S. Br. 69-71.  Respond-
ents rely (Br. 61-62) on Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 
(1974), but the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions 
“were not at issue in Ruiz.”  Vigil, 508 U.S. at 199.  
Rather, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had failed to 
comply with its own, more rigorous notice require-
ment.  Ibid.; see Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 233-234. 
More fundamentally, any notice-and-comment re-
quirements have already been satisfied for deferred 
action’s consequences:  Duly-promulgated regulations 
provide that all aliens with deferred action may apply 
for work authorization based on economic need and 
receive Social Security benefits, if they have earned 
them and are otherwise eligible.  8 C.F.R. 1.3(a)(4)(vi), 
274a.12(c)(14).5  Accordingly, unlike the agency action 
in Ruiz, the Guidance does not establish eligibility 
criteria for the applicability of those provisions:  
Those criteria were already established via preexist-
ing regulations adopted through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. 
 THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE PROVIDES NO BASIS VI.
FOR RELIEF 
A. Respondents’ “Take Care” argument is merit-
less.  They insist (Br. 71) that it “is distinct from 
                                                     
5  DHS’s interpretations of “lawful presence” for purposes of 
tolling and Social Security are exempt from notice-and-comment 
requirements as interpretative rules.  See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).  The 
Social Security rule also falls squarely within the “benefits” excep-
tion.  5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2). 
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[their] statutory arguments,” but their arguments are 
one and the same:  They argue that the Guidance 
“violates explicit as well as implicit congressional 
objectives” (Br. 75); it is “[a] ‘complete abdication’ of 
lawful-presence and work-authorization statutes” 
(ibid.); and it “seeks to make unlawful presence law-
ful” (Br. 73).  Either the Guidance is within the Secre-
tary’s statutory authority or it is not.  
Action by the Judiciary to enjoin the Executive on 
the basis of the Take Care Clause would, however, 
raise grave structural concerns about the relationship 
between the two Branches.  This Court has never 
viewed the Clause as an appropriate subject for judi-
cial intervention.  Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 475, 499 (1867).  Respondents downplay (Br. 71-
72) these concerns, arguing that their claim is direct-
ed at the Secretary, not the President himself.  But 
the Constitution assigns the responsibility to “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” to the 
President—not the courts.  U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3, 
Cl. 5.  In Johnson, Mississippi challenged the execu-
tion of the Reconstruction Acts by the President and 
a subordinate—and this Court dismissed the suit in its 
entirety.  See 71 U.S. at 497-498. 
Respondents point (Br. 71-77) to Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), but the 
government (unsuccessfully) invoked the Take Care 
Clause in defense as an affirmative source of authority 
for the President’s action.  Id. at 587.  Kendall v. 
United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524 
(1838), is also inapposite.  That case involved a “purely 
ministerial” duty subject to “no discretion whatever.”  
Id. at 613.  The President did not assert power to 
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dispense with that statute; “such power was dis-
claimed.”  Ibid.  So too here. 
B. In all events, the Secretary is faithfully enforc-
ing the immigration laws.  U.S. Br. 43-47, 74-75.  Re-
spondents contend (Br. 74) that, if the government 
prevails, future Presidents could abandon enforce-
ment of “environmental laws, or the Voting Rights 
Act,” or other laws.  But those hypotheticals are far 
removed.  The Secretary is vigorously enforcing the 
immigration laws, and the Guidance helps focus more 
resources on Congress’s chosen priorities.  Moreover, 
the Executive has unusually broad discretion in immi-
gration; few other areas involve status offenses where 
the exercise of discretion unavoidably tolerates an 
ongoing violation; none has such a well-established 
tradition, ratified by Congress, of notifying large 
groups of non-binding, temporary reprieves; and de-
ferred action’s consequences flow from immigration-
specific laws. 
In the end, the Secretary asserts only that he is 
acting within the immigration laws.  He is not at-
tempting to declare lawful conduct that Congress has 
made unlawful.  And whether the Secretary has cor-
rectly interpreted the immigration laws presents a 




* * * * * 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our 
opening brief, the judgment of the court of appeals 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
 
 DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR. 
Solicitor General 
APRIL 2016 
